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Abstract
The success of deep neural networks is clouded by two
issues: (1) a vulnerability to adversarial examples and (2) a
tendency to be uninterpretable. Interestingly, recent empir-
ical evidence in the literature as well as theoretical analysis
on simple models suggest these two seemingly disparate is-
sues are actually connected. In particular, robust models
tend to be more interpretable than non-robust models. In
this paper, we provide evidence for the claim that this re-
lationship is bidirectional. Viz., models that are optimized
to have interpretable gradients are more robust to adver-
sarial examples than models trained in a standard man-
ner. With further analysis and experiments on standard
image classification datasets, we identify two factors be-
hind this phenomenon—namely the suppression of the gra-
dient’s magnitude and the selective use of features guided
by high-quality interpretations—which explain model be-
haviors under various regularization and target interpreta-
tion settings.
1. Introduction
Over the past decade, deep neural networks (DNNs)
have produced unprecedented results across a wide range
of tasks. However, their impressive performance has been
clouded by two weaknesses: (1) a susceptibility to adversar-
ial perturbations and (2) a tendency to have uninterpretable
decision-making processes. These weaknesses erode users’
trust in DNNs and limit DNN adoption in security-critical
applications. These two problems were previously thought
to be separate, but recent results indicate that networks
trained to be robust to adversarial perturbations tend to be
more interpretable [44, 11, 2]. In this work we show that,
at least on standard image classification datasets, the im-
plication goes the other direction as well. In other words,
networks optimized to have interpretable gradients tend to
be more robust to adversaries than networks trained with
natural examples and networks trained using common input
gradient regularization schemes.
The first weakness of DNNs that we will discuess is
a susceptibility to adversarial perturbations. Adversarial
perturbations are small, imperceptible changes to an in-
put that cause a model to make incorrect predictions [42].
Many attacks that can efficiently find such perturbations
have been developed recently, including: the fast gradi-
ent sign method (FGSM) [13], projected gradient descent
(PGD) [23], DeepFool [26], and the Carlini-Wagner attack
[5]. In response to these attacks, many empirical and cer-
tified defense techniques have been proposed: adversarial
training [13], defensive distillation [31], gradient regular-
ization [33, 10, 28, 17], and randomized smoothing [22].
Despite the large volume of work in this area, even the best
performing defenses such as adversarial training are not per-
fect, and the reason for the existence of adversarial pertur-
bations remains a debated topic [12, 34, 4, 27, 16].
A second weakness of DNNs is their lack of inter-
pretability; i.e. it is difficult to understand how DNNs arrive
at their decisions. Their uninterpretable nature is especially
undesirable in domains such as medicine and law where the
reasoning behind a decision is just as important as the deci-
sion itself. This need for DNN interpretability has led to the
creation of many explanation-generating mechanisms such
as simple gradient [3], SmoothGrad [38], DeepLIFT [36],
Integrated Gradients [41], and LIME [32]. While these and
other explanation-generating mechanisms help reduce the
complexities of DNN behavior, by and large DNNs remain
black boxes.
Interestingly, recent results suggest that the two issues
of adversarial example vulnerability and model uninter-
pretability are connected; specifically, several works have
demonstrated that robust networks tend to be interpretable.
Tsipras et al. [44] found that the magnitudes of the gra-
dient of the loss function with respect to the input for ad-
versarially trained networks align well with what humans
find important. Similarly, it has been noticed that gradient
regularization [33] and a Lipschitz constraint [11] both lead
to qualitatively interpretable gradient maps. Etmann et al.
[11] showed that the magnitudes of the gradients of Lips-
chitz regularized DNNs align closely with the input images.
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These results indicate that optimizing a network for robust-
ness results in some degree of interpretability.
With this paper, we investigate the effects of optimizing
for interpretability; specifically, we seek to answer the ques-
tion: if a network is trained to have interpretable gradients,
will it be robust against adversarial attacks? In our exper-
iments, we train models to match the interpretations gener-
ated from a robust model acquired via adversarial training,
which provides interpretations that are more interpretable
than non-robust models. We call this method interpretation
regularization. The newly trained models are then shown to
be just as robust or more robust than networks trained with
Jacobian regularization, despite the fact that our method
only acts on one column of the input-output Jacobian rather
than the entire Jacobian [17, 39, 15].
Through further analysis, we discover that two factors
contribute to the effectiveness of interpretation regulariza-
tion: the suppression of the gradient and the selective use
of features guided by high-quality interpretations. The two
factors can explain model behaviors under various settings
of regularization and target interpretation.
With this paper, we make the following contributions:
• We empirically investigate whether networks opti-
mized to have interpretable gradients are robust to ad-
versarial attacks. We find that simply requiring the
model to match interpretations extracted from a robust
model can improve robustness.
• To explain the experimental results, we analyze the
connection between Jacobian regularization and inter-
pretation regularization. We identify two factors—the
suppression of the gradient and the selective use of fea-
tures guided by high-quality interpretations—that con-
tribute to the effectiveness of interpretation regulariza-
tion and explain model behaviors.
2. Related Work
2.1. Adversarial Attacks and Defenses
Szegedy et al. [42] were the first to bring to light the
brittleness of DNNs. They found that by adding small, im-
perceptible perturbations to the input, even state of the art
networks could be fooled into predicting the wrong label.
In addition, they showed that the troublesome perturbations
were not random; attacks designed for one network were
effective when transferred to another network.
Since their discovery, various techniques have been de-
veloped to find adversarial perturbations, and these tech-
niques can be categorized in a few ways. One categori-
cal split is based on whether the attacker uses the model’s
loss gradients. White-box attacks rely on the gradient of
the model’s loss function to find adversarial perturbations,
whereas black-box attacks do not need direct access to the
model’s loss gradient [29]. In addition to the white-box /
black-box dichotomy, adversarial attacks can also be clas-
sified as either untargeted or targeted. Untargeted attacks
work by adjusting the input sample so that the loss is maxi-
mized, but untargeted attacks do not attempt to force a cer-
tain prediction. On the other hand, targeted attacks do at-
tempt to perturb the input in a way so that a target class’s
score function is maximized. The constraint placed on the
adversary’s perturbation set is another way to differentiate
attacks. With image data it is common to constrain the set
of allowed perturbation by an `0, `2, or `∞ distance.
In recent years, a number of white-box attacks have been
proposed. In [13], Goodfellow et al. introduced the FGSM
for efficiently finding adversarial examples from a candi-
date point. The FGSM finds the sign of the gradient of
the loss function, scales it by a small amount ε, and then
adds this perturbation to the initial image. Projected gra-
dient descent (PGD) [23] works similarly but is iterative.
It is common to start the attack from some random initial
position near a candidate point, and then after each step,
project the current perturbation back into the set of allowed
perturbations. The Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack
[30] (JSMA) uses the Jacobian of the function learned by
a DNN to find adversarial perturbations that modify a small
fraction of the input dimensions that nevertheless fool the
DNN. DeepFool [26] attempts to find the smallest perturba-
tion needed to change the prediction of the classifier. Carlini
and Wagner created three new attacks for the `0, `2, and `∞
metrics that produce imperceptible perturbations to fool the
target network [5].
One of the first proposed and still most effective defenses
against adversarial attacks is adversarial training. In [13],
Goodfellow et al. introduce adversarial training as a defense
against FGSM perturbations. Adversarial training involves
placing the adversary in the training loop where it perturbs
each training sample before it is passed through the model.
Madry et al. [23] show that if the adversary is able to effec-
tively solve the inner maximization problem, the DNN can
adjust its parameters to withstand the worst case perturba-
tions. In practice, adversarial training has been shown to be
the best defense in many cases.
Born out of the realization that adversaries often use
noisy and extreme gradients to find adversarial examples
[37], a class of techniques that regularize the gradients of
the network in some manner has emerged. Ross et al. [33]
take the idea of double backpropagation, originally pro-
posed by LeCun et al. [10], and modify it for a cross-
entropy loss function. They show that regularizing the gra-
dient of the loss with respect to the input is an effective
defense against FGSM, JSMA, and the targeted gradient
sign method [20]. In a similar vein, Jakubovitz et al. [17]
showed that networks trained to regularize the gradient of
each output logit with respect to the input (i.e. the Frobenius
2
norm of the input-output Jacobian) are robust to FGSM,
JSMA, and DeepFool attacks. Dezfooli et al. [25] provide
evidence that regularizing the size of the input-output gra-
dients reduces the positive curvature of the decision bound-
ary, and the reduction of this positive curvature is correlated
with robustness. In addition to improving adversarial ro-
bustness, Jacobian regularization has been shown to be ben-
eficial for generalization [39]. Unfortunately, the compu-
tational costs associated with Jacobian regularization scale
linearly with the number of output classes, so in the past,
Jacobian regularization has not always been a computation-
ally feasible defense for classification problems with large
output spaces.
In addition to these defenses, others have been pro-
posed. Defensive Distillation [31] trains a small network
to match the output values generated from a larger network;
this results in the small network being robust to some at-
tacks. Parseval Networks, which [7] constrain the Lipschitz
constant of each hidden layer of a DNN to be small, and
networks trained with Cross-Lipschitz regularization [14],
which forces the differences between gradients of each class
score function to be small, give robustness in certain regions
around datapoints.
2.2. Interpreting DNNs
In the contemporary literature, the broad problem of in-
terpreting DNNs has been narrowed down to the more con-
crete subproblem of interpreting the individual predictions
a DNN makes. The typical form these interpretations take
is an estimation of the degree to which each input feature
contributes to a given prediction; this type of interpretation
is often referred to as an importance or attribution or sensi-
tivity or salience map.
One simple yet fairly effective salience map generation
method [3] relies entirely on the gradient of the network
output with respect to the input. If we approximate the
model local to the desired prediction (x, f(x)) in a naive
way via the tangent plane
f(x+ ε) = f(x) +∇f(x)>ε+ o(ε>ε) (1)
the relative importance of the feature xi is then |∂f(x)∂xi |. For
classification models where f outputs the class probability
distribution, the weights ∇f(x) can be interpreted roughly
as meaning, local to x, a change in xi by ±ε corresponds
to a change of ±ε∂f(x0)∂xi in the certainty of the class label.
While such interpretations highlight salient features of an
image, these simple DNN gradient salience maps often suf-
fer from a large degree of visual noise. This has motivated
the development of more elaborate salience map generation
techniques in order to tease out more structured and visu-
ally meaningful, but perhaps less locally faithful, interpre-
tations.
Due to the recent attention that model interpretability has
received, many interpretation mechanisms have been pro-
posed in the past few years. Some commonly considered
interpretation-generating methods include: the simple gra-
dient method described above [3], Gradient × Input [36],
probabilistic noise-based techniques like SmoothGrad [38]
and VarGrad [1] which approximates respectively the mean
and variance salience maps about the prediction of inter-
est given small random-noise perturbed input. Integrated
Gradients [41] which computes salience as the path integral
of the gradients along the straight line path from a base-
line (such as a blank image) to the desired input. Deep
Taylor Decomposition [24] models the salience in terms of
the first-order Taylor approximation as with simple gradi-
ent, but expands this about an appropriately chosen point
such that the attribution is performed in terms of an input-
weighted gradient. DeepLIFT [36], Guided Backpropa-
gation [40], and GradCAM / Guided GradCAM [35], are
methods that backpropagate attributions of the output to the
input. LIME [32] fits an interpretable local model based
off binarized variables where the coefficients measure the
correlations of variable activation and the model prediction.
SHAP [21] computes interpretations in terms of weighted
Shapley Scores approximating the performance drop when
a feature is removed. In contrast to the above techniques,
which focus on the present input, contrastive explanations
[8] identify components that are absent in the input and con-
tribute to the prediction.
Some recent literature has focused on evaluating the ap-
propriateness of salience map generation techniques. [19]
analyzes behaviors of interpretation methods acting on sim-
ple linear models. [1] proposes that salience methods
should satisfy include sensitivity towards model and label
perturbation. [18] argues they should have invariance to-
wards uniform mean shifts of the input. Several popular
methods, including Integrated Gradients, Grad × Input, In-
tegrated Gradients SmoothGrad (applies SmoothGrad av-
eraging to Integrated Gradients interpretations), Guided
Backprop, and Guided GradCAM, do not satisfy these ap-
parently reasonable requirements.
2.3. Relationship Between Adversarial Robustness
and Interpretability
Recently, it has been observed that robust networks tend
to be more “interpretable”. Anil et al.[2] remark that net-
works trained with Lipschitz constraints have gradients that
appear more interpretable. Similarly, Ross et al. [33] found
that gradient regularized networks have qualitatively more
interpretable gradient maps. Others [44, 6] note that the
simple gradient salience maps generated from adversarially
trained models are more coherent than those generated from
models that are not robust to certain adversarial perturba-
tions. Tsipras et al. [44] go on to hypothesize that mod-
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els that achieve a small loss on adversarial examples have
necessarily learned to rely on features that are invariant to
the adversary’s perturbations. Because humans are natu-
rally invariant to these perturbations, robust models tend to
function more similarly to the human vision system than
non-robust models. Etmann et al. [11] and Ilyas et al. [16]
provide theoretical justification that robust linear and piece-
wise linear classifiers tend to have gradients that are (nearly)
co-linear with the input images, which are considered to in-
troduce interpretability.
Taken together, there is evidence that model robustness
improves model interpretability. However, it is not obvious,
from these discussions, whether or not making a model’s
gradients interpretable could improve the model’s robust-
ness.
3. Approach
The objective of our experiments is to determine if, by
optimizing a model to have interpretable gradients, we can
gain robustness to adversarial perturbations. To this end,
we adopt a loss function that encourages the simple gradi-
ent salience map for each data point to agree with an inter-
pretable target salience map.
We employ the following notations. A data point, drawn
from the data distribution D, consists of an input x ∈ RD
and a label y ∈ RK . Here y is a K-dimensional one-hot
vector, which contains a single 1 at the correct class index
and zeros at the other K − 1 positions. We denote the cor-
rect label index of x as c(x). The neural network model is
denoted by fθ(·), where θ represents the model parameters.
The model’s prediction is denoted by yˆ = fθ(x). The Ja-
cobian matrix is J (x) = ∂yˆ∂x . If we can extract the slice of
the Jacobian corresponding to the correct label, we get the
simple gradient [3] salience map Jc(x)(x) = ∂yˆc(x)∂x .
In standard training, the optimal parameters θ∗ are found
by minimizing the cross-entropy loss.
LXE(x,y,θ) =
∑
i
yi log yˆi = yc(x) log yˆc(x) (2)
Assuming the availability of a target interpretation I(x)
(covered in Section 3.1), we can add a regularization term
to the standard loss in order to penalize the difference be-
tween the target salience map and the Jacobian salience map
generated by the model.
L(θ) = E
(x,y)∼D
[LXE(x,y,θ) + λ‖I(x)− Jc(x)(x)‖2]
(3)
where λ is a hyperparameter that controls the strength of the
regularization. We optimize the above loss function using
standard stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with momen-
tum.
3.1. Generating Target Interpretations
Using the SmoothGrad method [38], we extract target
salience maps for each data point from a pretrained neural
network (details in Section 3.2).
The SmoothGrad method first samples N points around
a given input x from the standard Gaussian distribution
and takes the mean of the simple gradient salience maps
generated for each sample. Formally, having drawn ei ∼
N (0, σ2), the interpretation I(x) is computed as
I(x) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
|Jc(x)(x+ ei)| (4)
In order to filter out small values that are usually ignored
by a human observer, we threshold the target salience map
with the standard deviation of the raw map. For each inter-
pretation I(x), we compute the pixel-level standard devia-
tion σI(x) and mean I¯(x). Any value in the target salience
map I(x) less than I¯(x) + φσI(x) is set to zero. The hy-
perparameter φ determines the strength of filtering. Figure
1 contains examples of generated target interpretations. It
can be observed that the thresholding operation removes the
smaller components of the interpretation and retains the im-
portant parts.
We choose SmoothGrad over other interpretation meth-
ods for two reasons. First, when coupled with gradient-
based interpretations it satisfies the basic sensitivity and in-
variance properties [1, 18] discussed in Section 2.2, which
assert that the interpretation is properly sensitive to the
model and data distributions. Second, from an adversar-
ial perspective, SmoothGrad can be understood as a method
for canceling out the influence of small perturbations on the
interpretation, which has the effect of drawing the interpre-
tation closer to what humans find meaningful [38].
3.2. Adversarial Training
We create a robust neural network using adversarial
training, one of the earliest and still most empirically re-
liable defenses. The purpose of this model is to supply the
target interpretations and serve as the upper bound for ro-
bustness in the experiments.
We adopt a PGD adversary that iteratively adds pertur-
bations to an input sample to fool a model. Formally, we let
xt denote the input after t iterations of transformation and
x0 = x. After each perturbation is added, the data point is
projected to the nearest point within an `2 hypersphere with
the radius ε around x0. This operation is denoted by the
function clipx0,ε(·). The sign(z) function maps the vector
z to the element-wise sign {−1, 1}. The iterative optimiza-
tion can be characterized as
xt+1 = clipx0,ε(xt + ε sign(LXE(xt,y,θ))), (5)
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Figure 1: MNIST (left column) and CIFAR-10 (right column) salience maps from adversarially trained networks and net-
works with standard training. The threshold φ is set to 1.
clipx0,ε(x
′) =
{
x0 +
x′−x0
‖x′−x0‖2 ε if ‖x′ − x0‖2 > ε
x′ otherwise.
(6)
After the adversarial examples are created, they are given
the original labels and used in place of the original samples
for the training of a robust model.
3.3. Jacobian Regularization
Jacobian regularization [17] is another adversarial de-
fense technique, which supplements the original cross en-
tropy loss with a regularization term.
L(θ) = E
(x,y)∼D
[LXE(x,y,θ) + λJ‖J (x)‖F ] (7)
where ‖ · ‖F is the Frobenius norm and λJ is a hyper-
parameter determining the strength of the regularization.
Comparing Eq. 7 with Eq. 3, we can see the regulariza-
tion term in Jacobian regularization suppresses all entries in
the Jacobian matrix, whereas interpretation regularization is
only concerned with one column of the Jacobian that corre-
sponds to the correct label.
4. Experiments
In this section, we first discuss the setup for the two
datasets, MNIST and CIFAR-10, followed by the baseline
techniques. After that, we present the empirical findings
and discuss their implications.
4.1. MNIST
For all of our experiments with the MNIST dataset, we
used the convolutional neural network (CNN) architecture
described here [43]. It has two convolutional layers of 32
and 64 filters. All filters are 5 × 5 in size and have a stride
of 1. Each convolutional layer is followed by a max-pooling
layer where the kernel size is 2× 2 and the stride is 2. The
output of the last pooling layer is fed into a fully-connected
layer with 1024 neurons. Here dropout with probability
p = 0.5 is applied before the final softmax output layer
consisting of 10 neurons. The output of all layers is passed
through the ReLU activation function.
This network was adversarially trained with a PGD ad-
versary (from the AdverTorch library [9]), starting from a
random initial perturbation of the training data. We re-
stricted the perturbations within an `2 norm of 1.5 (the pixel
values for each image were in the range [0,1]) and set the
number of iterations to 40. Tspiras et al. [44] demonstrated
that these values produced networks that had interpretable
simple gradient salience maps. The network was trained us-
ing SGD with momentum set at 0.9, an initial learning rate
of 0.01 that decayed by 90% every 10 epochs, and a batch
size of 64.
We then used SmoothGrad with σ = 0.15 and n = 50
(these values provide a good balance between noise reduc-
tion and fidelity [38]) to generate a target interpretation for
each training sample with the adversarially trained network.
These target salience maps were not normalized in any way.
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Using these target interpretations generated from the ro-
bust network, we trained a new network with the same ar-
chitecture with our loss (equation 3), again using SGD with
momentum set at 0.9, an initial learning rate of 0.01 that de-
cayed by 90% every 10 epochs, and a batch size of 64. We
performed a grid search across λ (controls the strength of
the regularization) and φ (controls the target interpretation
threshold) and found that a λ of 0.07 and a φ of 1 produced
the best results. The results of this experiment can be found
in the Interp. Reg. Robust row of Table 1.
We then conducted an experiment in which we took the
original target interpretations from the robust network and
randomly permuted their values and trained a second net-
work to match these permuted target interpretations (row
titled Interp. Reg. Robust Perm. in Table 1). We used the
same threshold value, φ = 1 and tuned λ so that the training
loss was comparable to our other nets (λ = 0.05). Our goal
with this experiment was to determine the degree to which
the distribution of of values in the target interpretation mat-
tered.
We then carried out a third experiment with our method.
We extracted target interpretations using SmoothGrad from
a model that was trained in a standard manner (so it had
low robustness to the PGD adversary) and trained a second
model to match these target interpretations (Interp. Reg.
Non-robust). We performed a grid search over various val-
ues of φ and λ, finding φ = 1 and λ = 0.33 to produce the
best results.
In order to investigate the effects of different defenses
and regularization methods, we produce a number of base-
lines, including standard training with only natural images
(Std. Training), adversarial training with the PGD adversary
described above (Adv. Training), and Jacobian regulariza-
tion. All results are in Table 1.
4.2. CIFAR-10
For our CIFAR-10 experiments, we used a CNN with the
architecture in [31]. The CNN has four convolutional lay-
ers: the first and second have 64 filters, and the third and
fourth have 128 filters. Each filter has a stride of 3. Af-
ter the second and fourth convolutional layers, max-pooling
with a kernel size of 2 was used. The convolutional layers
were followed by two fully connected layers of 256 units
each before the final softmax output layer of 10 neurons.
Dropout with p = 0.5 was used on the fully connected lay-
ers during training. ReLU was the activation function used
for all of the layers.
This architecture was then adversarially trained with a
PGD adversary. Each perturbation started from a random
intial position and was constrained by an `2 norm with ep-
silon at 0.314 (again, the pixel values for each image were in
the range [0,1]), and again the number of iterations was set
to 40. As with MNIST, Tsipras et al. [44] demonstrated that
training against this adversary produced networks with in-
terpretable gradients. The network was trained using SGD
with momentum at 0.9, an initial learning rate of 0.01 that
decayed as with MNIST, and a batch size of 100.
With this robust network, we used SmoothGrad to gen-
erate the target salience map for each input image. As with
MNIST, these salience maps were not normalized. We then
used the target salience maps to train a new network with
the same architecture using our modified loss (equation 3).
The network was trained using SGD with momentum at 0.9,
an initial learning rate of 0.01 that decayed as with MNIST,
and a batch size of 100.
Again, we performed a grid search across λ and φ, find-
ing λ = .025 and φ = 1 to provide a training loss close
to that of adversarial training. To provide baselines for
comparison, we trained other copies of the architecture us-
ing standard training, adversarial training (using the same
PGD adversary described above), and Jacobian regulariza-
tion. Again, we tuned the hyperparameter λJ for Jacobian
regularization so the final training loss matched those net-
works trained with interpretation regularization to facilitate
meaningful comparison.
4.3. Results
Tables 1 and 2 reports the standard and adversarial accu-
racy for the models on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets.
The adversarial accuracies against PGD adversaries con-
strained by `2 and `∞ norms with various epsilons. With
unperturbed data, standard training achieves the highest
accuracy and all defense techniques slightly degrade the
performance. With adversarial input, adversarial training
yields the best performance as we expect. Comparing the
interpretation regularization method with Jacobian regular-
ization, the former outperforms by a margin of 2.31% on
MNIST and roughly on par with the latter on CIFAR-10.
To further understand the reason behind the good per-
formance of interpretation regularization, we compute the
norm of the gradients for the correct label ∇fc(x)(x) and
those of the incorrect labels, denoted as∇fy\c(x)(x) on all
MNIST models. We aggregated over all output logits to find
the non-label gradient magnitudes and then aggregated over
all of the samples in the training set. We report the mean
norms over the dataset for both correct and incorrect label
logit gradients. See Table 3 for the complete results.
The results show that for most models, ∇fc(x)(x) was
indeed nearly twice as large as ∇fy\c(x)(x). Both Jaco-
bian regularization and interpretation regularization have
low gradients norms. Adversarial training, despite being the
strongest defense, has higher gradient norms than the two
other defenses we tested. Interestingly, the lowest norm for
∇fc(x)(x) are achieved when the target interpretations are
randomly permuted.
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Technique
Standard
MNIST
Accuracy
Adversarial Accuracy
`2 norm `∞ norm
ε = 1.5 ε = 2.5 ε = 0.1 ε = 0.2 ε = 0.3
Standard Training 99.38 ± 0.05 61.05 ± 0.57 28.32 ± 0.84 78.50 ± 0.30 4.37 ± 0.67 0.00 ± 0.00
Adv. Training (`2 norm) 99.29 ± 0.02 90.21 ± 0.10 42.58 ± 0.76 96.25 ± 0.04 65.81 ± 2.46 0.82 ± 0.26
Jacobian Regularization 99.13 ± 0.03 82.86 ± 0.10 29.22 ± 0.32 92.05 ± 0.24 41.92 ± 1.03 0.58 ± 0.09
Interp. Reg. Robust 99.15 ± 0.02 85.17 ± 0.21 32.76 ± 0.26 93.47 ± 0.12 47.54 ± 1.80 0.64 ± 0.18
Interp. Reg. Robust Perm. 99.12 ± 0.04 80.83 ± 0.34 31.12 ± 0.81 89.24 ± 0.41 34.30 ± 2.02 0.10 ± 0.10
Interp. Reg. Non-robust 99.13 ± 0.05 60.96 ± 1.13 7.75 ± 0.43 83.59 ± 0.69 10.00 ± 1.20 0.05 ± 0.04
Table 1: MNIST accuracy and 95% confidence intervals based on 5 independent trials. Best results are underlined and second
best results are in bold.
Techniques
Standard
CIFAR-10
Accuracy
Adversarial Accuracy
`2 norm `∞ norm
ε = 80/255 ε = 320/255 ε = 4/255 ε = 8/255
Standard Training 78.29 ± 0.26 14.93 ± 1.49 2.23 ± 0.29 13.80 ± 0.99 3.40 ± 0.44
Adv. Training (`2 norm) 74.51 ± 0.20 57.43 ± 0.15 10.97 ± 0.09 43.86 ± 0.34 19.48 ± 0.24
Jacobian Regularization 74.21 ± 0.24 51.34 ± 0.13 4.27 ± 0.23 35.75 ± 0.45 12.86 ± 0.19
Interp. Reg. Robust 74.66 ± 0.25 51.43 ± 0.39 6.66 ± 0.14 39.15 ± 0.56 16.05 ± 0.20
Table 2: CIFAR-10 accuracy and 95% confidence intervals based on 5 independent trials. Best results are underlined and
second best results are in bold.
‖∇fc(x)(x)‖ ‖∇fy\c(x)(x)‖
Std. Training 7.43± 0.04 3.93± 0.02
Adv. Training 2.48± 0.04 1.47± 0.02
Jacobian Reg. 1.69± 0.01 0.68± 0.01
Interp. Reg. R. 1.72± 0.01 1.19± 0.01
Interp. Reg. R. Perm. 0.85± 0.01 1.67± 0.01
Interp. Reg. N.R. 5.45± 0.00 2.37± 0.02
Table 3: Mean gradient norms on MNIST for different mod-
els. The 95% confidence intervals are computed across all
training samples and across five independent training ses-
sions using the same hyperparameters as in Table 1.
4.4. Discussion
We find it surprising that interpretation regularization
performs comparably with or better than Jacobian regular-
ization. We hypothesize two factors which explain the suc-
cess, and attempt to disentangle their contributions towards
this phenomenon. First, a qualitative analysis shows Ja-
cobian regularization and interpretation regularization bear
some similarities. Second, the robust target interpretation
guides the new model to focus on features which we hypoth-
esize are robust under adversarial perturbation, and encode
small gradient priors which induces interpretation regular-
ization to suppress the magnitude of the gradient.
Connection between Jacobian and interpretation reg-
ularization. Jacobian regularization attaches a uniform
prior for small gradients on this column. In comparison, in-
terpretation regularization proposes a candidate distribution
for the gradient. Despite these differences, we can show
that these two methods bear some similarities.
Jacobian regularization forces the model to constrain the
weights it learns so that the gradients ‖∂f(x)∂x ‖|x=x0 are
small, smoothing out the local geometry of the loss func-
tion and pushing the decision boundary away from points
that are candidate adversarial examples. Let ρ(x) be an up-
per bound on the change in confidence necessary to flip the
prediction of f(x), for instance, 50%. If a point x0 can
be adversarially attacked by a small perturbation δx0 , then
‖f(x0+δx0)−f(x0)‖ > ρ(x0). In contrast, for most ran-
dom noise perturbations η whose magnitude ‖η‖ ≈ ‖δx0‖,
we should expect ‖f(x0 + η) − f(x0)‖ < ζ < ρ(x0) to
be small. In this case, we can show that the contribution
to the Jacobian is predominately from the adversarial terms
along the directional derivative∇δx0 f(x0) =
∂f(x0)
∂x
>
δx0 .
Expanding f(x0 +δx0) and f(x0 +η) in terms of the first-
order Taylor approximations yields norm bounds on the di-
rectional derivatives
‖∇δx0 f(x0)‖ ≈ ρ(x0) and ‖∇ηf(x0)‖ / ζ, (8)
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so that
‖∇δx0 f(x0)‖ ≈ ρ(x0)
' ρ(x0)
ζ
‖∇ηf(x0)‖.
(9)
In particular, the coefficient ρ(x0)ζ is (much) larger than
one. Since the norm of the adversarial perturbation is con-
strained by the `2 norm ε, the key to a successful attack is
to set up δx0 such that it selects large components of
∂f(x)
∂x0
.
From this we can draw two conclusions: Jacobian regular-
ization creates robustness because it disproportionately im-
pacts gradient components corresponding to adversarial at-
tack directions, and as δx0 is constrained, it follows that any
entries in the Jacobian matrix that are greater than others are
heavily penalized by the regularization.
Interestingly, as Table 3 shows, in most setups the gradi-
ent for the correct label is greater than that of the incorrect
labels. Under small perturbations, it seems reasonable to
suppose the change in confidence for the correct label dis-
sipates across the other labels, leading to smaller gradients.
Thus, the gradient of the correct label is penalized more
heavily than the rest. This behavior is similar to interpre-
tation regularization, which constrains the gradient of the
correct label but not the rest. Thus, we argue that one of the
reasons for the effectiveness of interpretation regularization
is that, like Jacobian regularization, it constrains the gradi-
ent in the most important places.
The quality of the interpretation matters. The above
analysis does not include the quality of the target interpre-
tation. However, in practice, different target interpretations
result in models with very different adversarial accuracies.
Models trained with robust target interpretations (Interp.
Reg. R.) and permuted robust target interpretations (Interp.
Reg. R. Perm.) have similar gradient magnitudes, but dif-
ferent adversarial accuracy, which can only be attributed to
the differences in their target interpretation. Similarly, Ja-
cobian regularization could be considered to have all-zero
target interpretations for all output labels and its adversarial
accuracy is lower than Interp. Reg. R.
Intuitively, the gradient of the model indicates the impor-
tant features used by the model. [16] suggests that model
brittleness is caused by the model using non-robust features
in making predictions. It follows that if we can constrain
the model to use only robust features, we should be able
to create robust models. The examples in Figure 1 suggest
a qualitative difference: the interpretations from the robust
model capture the most important features but the interpre-
tations from the non-robust model appear less appropriate,
potentially misguiding models. Thus, we argue that another
reason interpretation regularization works is the interpreta-
tion guides the model to use the correct and possibly robust
features.
Figure 2: Comparison of original and thresholded versions
of SmoothGrad and simple gradient salience maps.
Disentangling gradient magnitude and interpretation
quality. Unexpectedly, Interp Reg. R. Perm. is able to
achieve a high level of robustness despite having random
target interpretations. We contend that the robustness comes
from the low gradient magnitudes (see Table 3) rather than
the quality of the interpretation. In contrast, even though the
target interpretations used by Interp Reg. N.R. may be bet-
ter than random permutation, its large gradient magnitudes
result in low adversarial accuracy.
An aspect of the gradient magnitude worth recognizing
is that with interpretation regularization we constrain the
size of the gradients by requiring them to be similar in mag-
nitude to the target interpretations. Interp Reg. N.R. draws
the target interpretation from models with Standard Train-
ing, which has large gradient norms, whereas Interp Reg.
R. Perm. draws the target interpretations from Adversarial
Training, which has smaller gradient norms. This may help
explain the discrepancy in adversarial accuracy between In-
terp Reg. R. Perm. and Interp Reg. N.R.
Does SmoothGrad create a difference? SmoothGrad
was proposed to average out noise that appear in the gra-
dient salience map. In our approach, the smoothed noises
become small values and get removed by the thresholding.
This may focus the salience map on robust features only, as
SmoothGrad highlights the important features in common
over a small neighborhood. Figure 2 qualitatively compares
SmoothGrad and simple gradients. The extra stroke to the
left of the number eight, a potentially non-robust feature,
has been assigned less importance by SmoothGrad than by
simple gradient. We leave a thorough analysis of different
interpretation methods for future work.
5. Conclusions
The abundance of adversarial attacks and the lack of in-
terpretation of how a deep neural network makes its predic-
tions are two issues that render many results from artificial
intelligence untrustworthy in the eye of the general public.
The literature suggests that these two issues may be closely
related, as works have indicated qualitatively that adversar-
ial defenses techniques, such as adversarial training [44],
Jacobian regularization [33], and Lipschitz constraints [11]
produce models that have salience maps that agree with hu-
man interpretations.
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These findings naturally lead to the question if the con-
verse is true. If we force a neural network to have inter-
pretable gradients, will it then become robust? We devise a
technique called interpretation regularization, which regu-
larizes the gradient of a model to match the target interpre-
tation extracted from an adversarially trained robust model.
Interestingly, the new model performs comparably or bet-
ter than Jacobian regularization, which applies more con-
straints than interpretation regularization.
In the discussion, we carefully disentangle two factors
that contribute to the effectiveness of interpretation regular-
ization: the suppression of the gradient and the selective use
of features guided by high-quality interpretations. With the
two factors, we manage to explain model behaviors under
various settings of regularization and target interpretation.
We believe this study provides useful insights into the re-
search of adversarial defenses and interpretation methods.
The joint investigation of these two issues will continue to
foster our understanding of deep neural networks.
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